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"[I]f... [the accused] voluntarily absents himself, this... leaves the court free to
proceed with the trial in like manner... as if he were present." Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
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INTRODUCTION

The scenario begins in an uneventful manner. The state has already charged
the accused, and he has either hired counsel or had counsel appointed. Prior to trial,
the accused and counsel have a private meeting where the accused and counsel
share confidential communications to which the attorney-client privilege attaches.'
The scene then shifts to trial. The accused is present at the commencement of
the trial. But after trial begins, the accused flees, voluntarily' absenting himself
from the remainder of the trial. The prevailing view is that at least when the
accused is present at the outset of the trial,3 the accused "waives" or, more precisely,
forfeits his or her right to attend the trial, and the trial may therefore continue in his
or her absence-in absentia.4 After the judge decides to continue the trial, the

1. Most jurisdictions recognize a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989). But that exception comes into play only if, at the very time
of the communication, the client sought the attorney's advice to facilitate the commission of a future
crime or fraud.

2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES

§ 6.13.2.d(1), at 972-75 (2002). Thus, if a client in custody sought the attorney's advice in order to
help the client later illegally escape from custody, the exception would apply and privilege would not
attach to their communication. For purposes of this hypothetical scenario, however, this Article
assumes that the client forms the intent to flee after the communication with the attorney.
2. At a later point in time, the accused may attempt to establish that his absence was involuntary.
Suppose, for example, that the accused has persuasive evidence that he was absent because he had been
kidnapped. In that event, the court can set aside the conviction and grant the accused a new trial de
novo. See UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 713(b) cmt., 10 U.L.A. 197 (1987); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(d), at 464 n.51 (2d ed. 1999); Myra L. Willis, Note, Criminal Trials in
Absentia: A ProposedReformfor Indiana, 56 IND. L.J. 103, 118 (1980). Alternatively, the accused
can argue that he or she lacked notice of the time of the hearing which he or she missed. For instance,
in State v. Whitley, 85 P.3d 116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), the accused was absent when the jury returned
to open court and announced its verdict at 3:35 p.m. The defense counsel had evidently instructed the
accused to return to court at 4:30 p.m.
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43; United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that a trial actually begins for Rule 43 purposes when jury selection begins); Stoddard v.
State, 112 N.W. 453, 454-554Wis. 1907) (holding that although "every person tried for a felony has
the right to be present at the trial, and the whole of it[,] ... the right is one which a defendant may
voluntarily waive, to the extent at least of absenting himself during a portion of the trial"); Lynch v.
Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 189, 194 (1879) (acknowledging that defendant, having been called in while
voluntarily absent, need not be present when the jury reads its verdict); Wilson v. State, 2 Ohio St. 319,
321-22 (1853) (holding that a defendant cannot be present throughout the entire trial and then
"voluntarily absent himself at the moment the verdict is rendered, and take advantage of that absence
to avoid judgment"); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 24.2(d) (noting that in a case where a defendant
was voluntarily absent from his trial, the logical approach is to view this scenario as effecting a
"forfeiture of a right by misconduct") (footnote omitted); 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE 1643.08[2] (3d ed. 2003) ("In any noncapital case, the defendant may impliedly
waive the right to be present if he or she is voluntarily absent after the trial has begun" so long as the
defendantwas "initially present at the trial."); Neil P. Cohen, Trial in AbsentiaRe-Examined, 40 TENN.
L. REV. 155, 158-61 (1973) ("Once begun in the defendant's presence, a non-capital felony trial can
proceed without him if he subsequently 'voluntarily' absents himself from the proceedings."); Willis,
supra note 2, at 116-17 (noting that Indiana courts acknowledge "a defendant's absence at the
commencement of trial should be treated differently from an absence after the trial has begun" for a
variety of reasons).
4. See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972); People v. Smith, 721
N.E.2d 553, 557 (Ill. 1999); Pinkney v. State, 711 A.2d 205, 210-28 (Md. 1998); see also 3 FRANCIS
A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE 223-24 (2d ed. 1999) (setting out
Rule 804, which governs when the accused's presence is and is not required at trial proceedings); 1
GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra, § 13-32.20 (discussing the ways an accused may waive his right to be
present at trial); Neil P. Cohen, Can They Kill Me If I'm Gone: Trialin Absentia in CapitalCases, 36
U. FLA. L. REV. 273, 276-77 (1984) (explaining that, although Rule 43 does not distinguish between
capital and noncapital cases when determining whether a defendant has waived his right to be present
at trial, the Supreme Court seems to have articulated a rule that capital case defendants have to be

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss3/10

2

Gilligan
Raised
to the
Second
Power: Waivers of Evidentiary Privile
IN ABSENTIA
TRIED
BEING
ACCUSED
2005]and Imwinkelried: Waiver

defense counsel realizes that one of the accused's pretrial communications with
counsel would be relevant exculpatory evidence. Counsel attempts to introduce the
statement as defense testimony.
The question posed is whether the defense counsel should be empowered to
waive the accused's attorney-client privilege, which would otherwise bar the
introduction of testimony about the statement. The question is not merely
hypothetical. Rather, the question is one the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces faced in UnitedStatesv. Marcum.5 InMarcum,during the innocence
phase of his trial, the accused testified but was nevertheless found guilty. After a
recess, the accused went absent without leave (AWOL). During the sentencing
phase, as military law permits, the trial defense counsel offered into evidence the
accused's unswom statement. The trial judge admitted the statement which was a
writing that the accused had prepared before trial. On appeal, the accused had new
counsel; appellate defense counsel contended that the trial judge had erred in
permitting defense counsel to waive the accused's personal attorney-client privilege.
In 2002, the intermediate appellate court, the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals (C.C.A.), refused to reverse.6 Of the several grounds the court
cited for doing so, one was that the accused had already waived the privilege.7 The
appellate court found that in his earlier trial testimony, the accused referred to "a
significant part of the matters contained in the" written statement.8 Another ground
was that even if the trial defense attorney had violated the accused's attorney-client
privilege, the error was harmless.9 The court stated that the contents of the
statement were not prejudicial but largely favorable to the accused. The third and
final ground, though, is of immediate interest. The court concluded that the trial
defense counsel had the authority to waive the accused's privilege:
Even if ... the appellant did not waive the attorney-client
privilege himself, "the [attorney] generally has implicit authority
to waive the privilege as well in the course of the representation."
Our superior court recognized this authority in United States v.
Province, 45 MJ. 359 (1996). In that case, the accused gave a
copy of 4 2 year-old "stragglers' orders" to his trial defense
counsel. In effect, these orders documented the accused's prior
uncharged period ofunauthorized absence. Trial defense counsel
used the orders during pretrial negotiations in an attempt to get an
administrative separation for the accused. He also gave a copy of
the orders to [the prosecutor] out of concern that the information
would come out during the providence inquiry and complicate the
plea .... Our superior court held that "the disclosure of the

stragglers' orders was made in facilitation of representation, and

present at trial); James G. Starkey, Trial In Absentia, 53 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 741-45 (1979)
(examining the history of trial in absentia and the nature of waiver by voluntary absence and
concluding that a defendant's presence at trial is not required as it once was-proceeding without him
does not necessarily offend the fairness of the system).
5. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
6. United States v. Marcum, No. ACM 34216,2002 CCA LEXIS 173, at *2 (A.F.C.C.A. July 25,
2002).
7. Id. at *10-11.
8. Id.
9. Id. at "13.
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defense counsel would be impliedly authorized to disclose this
information for [that] purpose."'0
The C.C.A. decision in Marcum hardly answers whether counsel can waive the
attomey-client privilege. To begin with, the Marcum court itself lacked sufficient
confidence in its analysis of defense counsel's authority to rest the decision squarely
on the basis that the attorney can waive a client's privilege. Instead, the court cited
that argument as one of three separate grounds for its disposition. Moreover, the
primary and secondary authorities are not compelling. The primary authority, the
Province case, involved the defense counsel's use of otherwise privileged
statements during plea negotiations. Like the civilian Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Military Rules of Evidence provide limited protection for the use of matters
disclosed during plea negotiations. 2 Thus, a defense counsel's revelation of an
otherwise privileged statement in the plea negotiation context might not3
compromise the defense's ability to later exclude testimony about the statement.'
The secondary authority is indeed a highly respected treatise. But the entire
discussion of the defense counsel's authority in the treatise consists of a single
sentence: "The lawyer generally has implicit authority to waive the privilege ... in
the course of the representation." 4 Not only does this particular passage fail to cite
any authority supporting the proposition, it also seems at odds with the virtually
axiomatic notion that only the client can waive the client's privilege." In short, the
Marcum decision by the intermediate court cannot be the final word on the
question.
In August 2004, the higher court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.), reviewed Marcum. 6 The majority reversed the C.C.A.
decision and set aside the accused's sentence. 7 At the beginning of its evaluation
of the defense counsel's conduct, the majority stressed that the decision of whether
to make an unsworn statement is "personal to the accused."'" The court stated that
"if an accused is absent without leave his right to make an unsworn statement is
forfeited unless prior to his absence he authorized his counsel to make a specific
statement on his behalf."' 9 Because the majority found no evidence that the accused
had authorized the defense counsel to introduce the writing as an unsworn
statement, the defense counsel should not have proffered the statement. The
majority concluded that the writing in question contained information subject to the
attorney-client privilege and that the defense counsel had not obtained a waiver
from the accused.20 As support for its conclusion, the majority cited Military Rule

10. Id. at *11-12 (internal citations omitted).
11. FED. R. EVID.410.

12. See MIL. R. EVID.

410; DAVID A. SCHLUETER, STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEED. SCHINASI &

EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, MILITARY EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 7-10(B) (2d ed. 2000).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 61 cmt. d (2000) ("In most

jurisdictions, statements made in the course of settlement negotiations are not thereafter admissible in
evidence to establish liability against the person who or whose lawyer made the statement. [Thus], a
lawyer must use due care.., to avoid unintended waiver of the attorney-client privilege ...").
14. 2 STEPHENA. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERALRULESOF EVIDENCEMANUAL § 501.02[5][k][ii],
at 501-47 (8th ed. 2002).
15. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 6.12.3, at 847 n.36 (collecting authorities that "only a
holder may consent to a waiver").
16. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
17. Id. at211.
18. Id. at 209.
19. Id. at210.
20. Id.
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of Evidence 51 1-the provision designating the client as the holder of the attorneyclient privilege.2
While the C.A.A.F. majority asserted that the defense counsel could not waive
the accused's privilege, Chief Judge Crawford filed a dissent addressing the
sentencing statement issue.22 She advanced four distinct arguments for her
conclusion that permitting the defense counsel to include the information in
question in the unsworn statement was not error. The initial three theories were:
(1) the communication was not privileged to begin with,23 (2) the accused waived
any privilege by allowing the defense counsel to use the information contained in
the statement to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,24 and (3) the accused also
waived privilege by testifying to many of the matters reflected in the writing.2" The
fourth and final ground for her dissent was that, assuming arguendo that the
information was privileged, the defense counsel had implied authority under the
circumstances to waive the privilege and reveal the information.2 6
Neither the majority nor the dissent supplies a definitive answer to the present
question. The majority's rejection of defense counsel's authority to waive the
privilege purports to be an alternative holding, but the analysis is arguably dictum.
If, as a threshold matter, the defense counsel had no authority to introduce an
unsworn statement at all, whether the contents were privileged vel non should make
no difference. Moreover, although the majority cited the Military Rule of Evidence
designating the client as the holder of the privilege, that rule does not explicitly
address the question of whether the attorney should ever be granted implied-in-law
authority to waive the privilege. For her part, Chief Judge Crawford marshaled
several authorities cutting in favor of conferring such implied-in-law authority.27
She added no policy argument to justify the conferral, however, and merely reprised
the authorities cited by the court below. Thus, neither the intermediate court nor the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has provided a fully satisfactory answer to
the question.
Consequently, despite the Marcum litigation, the waiver issue requires more
extended analysis. This Article maintains that in Marcum, Chief Judge Crawford
and the Court of Criminal Appeals reached the correct conclusion: Counsel
representing an accused being tried in absentia should have the authority to waive
the accused's privilege. The analysis must begin with some much broader issues
than waiver. The first Part of this Article surveys the authorities dealing with
counsel's implied authority to waive the client's privilege and concludes that the
existing authorities do not provide a firm answer to this question.
The second Part undertakes a critical evaluation of the question, addressing the
larger questions referred to above: What constitutional rights would the accused
otherwise enjoy? To what extent does the accused "waive" or forfeit those rights
by voluntarily absenting himself or herself from the trial? If the accused retains the
right to introduce favorable evidence to which a privilege applies, should the
21. Id. at211.
22. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 211 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. The thrust of this argument appeared to be that the defense counsel informed the accused
that the writing might be used as a trial exhibit; hence, the accused did not have the requisite intent to
maintain the confidentiality of the communication. The Chief Judge stated that "defense counsel's
declaration of intent to submit the exhibit as Appellant's unsworn statement establishes that the
statement was not privileged in the first place." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at212.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 212 n.8 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
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defense counsel hold the power to waive the client's privilege? In the course of
reaching the more narrow question posed by Marcum, this Article grapples with
broader issues such as the concept of forfeiture, constitutional rights, and the trial
attorney's role as client surrogate.
II. A

SURVEY OF THE AUTHORITIES RELEVANT TO AN ATTORNEY'S IMPLIED

POWER TO WAIVE HIS OR HER CLIENT'S ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
WITHOUT

A GRANT

OF ACTUAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CLIENT

Four distinct, but related, bodies of law exist that are relevant to whether the
defense counsel holds implied authority to waive the evidentiary privilege of a client
being tried in absentia.
A.

Legal Ethics

Legal ethics is a body of law relevant to the waiver question. The American
Bar Association's Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 governs confidentiality
of information.28 Rule 1.6(a) announces the general rule that a lawyer may not
reveal confidential information. The rule states in the alternative that a lawyer may
reveal "information relating to the representation of a client" either when "the client
gives informed consent" or when "the disclosure is impliedly authorized.., to carry
out the representation."29 The Official Comment to Rule 1.6 explains:
Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special
circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized
to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying
out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer
may be implicitly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly
be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory
conclusion to a matter.3 °
This body of law does not furnish a definitive answer to the question posed in
United States v. Marcum. The Official Comment to Rule 1.6 emphasizes that under
the Model Rules, the concept of "confidential information" includes not only
technically privileged communications from the client, but also "all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source."'" Thus, in some cases Rule
1.6(b)(1) disclosures will involve information in which the client has a less intense
privacy interest than privileged client communications. Moreover, the original
Official Note to Rule 1.6 acknowledged that some states rejected the position taken
by the Rule and demanded the client's "express consent" to any disclosure.32
Furthermore, one of the examples cited in the Comment is disclosure during

28.
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2003 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 25 (2003).

29. Id. at 25-26.
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id.
32. MODELRULESOF PROF'LCONDUCT note (Draft 198 1) (Exceptions to Confidentiality) (citing
People v. Gerold, 107 N.E. 165 (Il1. 1914)).
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negotiation.33 As previously stated, other exclusionary rules of evidence come into
play in that context and may prevent the subsequent evidentiary use of the disclosed
information.34 Finally and most fundamentally, the Model Rule regulates only a
question of legal ethics; the Rule does not purport to control the evidentiary
question. In short, even if, as a matter of legal ethics,35 an attorney could reveal
privileged information, the attorney might lack the authority to do so under evidence
law.
B. GeneralAgency
The second pertinent body is the general law of agency. Just as the American
Bar Association's Model Rules address the legal ethical issue, the American Law
Institute's new Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers speaks to the

agency question. Section 61 of the Restatement is on point and is strikingly similar
to Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). 3 6 Section 61 reads as follows: "A lawyer may... disclose
confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably believes that doing so
will advance the interests of the client in the representation."37

The Official

Comment states that section 61 is intended to define "the agency power of
lawyers. '"38 The Comment asserts that "[a] lawyer has general authority to take
steps reasonably calculated to further the client's objectives in the representation." 9
Further parallels to the Model Rule exist. In explaining the scope of section 61,
the Official Comment gives the example of disclosure during settlement
negotiations."' After citing that example, the Comment indicates that "[i]n most
jurisdictions, statements made in the course of settlement negotiations are not
thereafter admissible in evidence to establish liability against the person who, or
whose lawyer, made the statement."'"

Again, the example given is one in which

the lawyer's disclosure might not prevent the client from barring subsequent
evidentiary use of the statement.

33. The prior version of the Official Comment expressly referred to "negotiation." MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, supranote 28, at 27. The current version uses broader language, "facilitates a satisfactory
conclusion to a matter." Id. Of course, a fair negotiated settlement is "a satisfactory conclusion to [the]
matter."
34. FED. R. EVID. 408-10.

35. The ABA Model Rules are not the only authority relevant to the ethical propriety of a
counsel's conduct in disclosing privileged information without a client's actual consent. In criminal
practice, the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards are also pertinent. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. Defense Function Standard § 4-5.2(a) provides that certain
decisions such as the entry of a plea, the type of forum, entry into a pretrial agreement, the choice

whether to testify, and the choice whether to forego an appeal must be made by the defendant. Id. § 45.2(a), at 199-200. But other strategic and tactical decisions are to be made by the "lawyer after
consultation with the client." Id. § 4-5.2(b), at 200. "If a disagreement" arises between the lawyer and
client on "significant matters of tactics or strategy," the Standards require the lawyer to record the
circumstances, noting both the advice given and the conclusion reached. Id. § 4-5.2(c), at 200. The
Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard have adopted these standards. 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note
4, § 5-54.00, at 199.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 61 (2000).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 61 cmt. a, at 480.
39. Id. § 61 cmt. b, at 480.
40. Id. § 61 cmt. d, at 481.
41. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 61, at 482 (2000)
("The law permits a lawyer negotiating a settlement to make statements 'without prejudice."').
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The Comment also discusses the applicability of section 61 to disclosures
during litigation. The language of section 61 is certainly broad enough to extend
to the trial context. The Comment makes it clear that the drafters also intended
section 61 to apply at trial.42 The Comment illustrates this application of section 61
as follows:
A lawyer who reasonably believes that it is in the interests of
the client to do so may refrain from objecting to an adversary's
attempt to introduce otherwise inadmissible confidential client
information, even if that failure will cause the waiver of a
privilege . . . . For example, a lawyer may acquiesce in an
adversary's eliciting testimony from the lawyer's client that,
although privileged under the attorney-client privilege, is
favorable to the client's litigation position."3
In another passage, the Comment refers to a lawyer's "fail[ure] to object to an
adversary's introduction in evidence of a client's privileged communication.""
Thus, despite the breadth of the language of section 61, all the cited examples are
situations in which the waiver of the privilege results from the lawyer's failure to
object to the opponent's presentation of privileged information. None of the
examples involves the lawyer waiving the attorney-client privilege by affirmatively
introducing privileged communications, as in the Marcum fact pattern.
C. Evidence
the general agency issue, the Reporter's Note
While the Restatement discusses
,45
cites Dean Wigmore's Evidence treatise as authority.' The treatise addresses the
specific and narrower question of whether the lawyer has authority to waive the
attorney-client privilege. Dean Wgnore takes the position that the lawyer
Like the official comments to the Model
sometimes possesses such authority.
Rules and Restatement provisions, however, Dean Wigmore's text focuses primarily
on the question of whether the attorney has authority to make disclosures during
pretrial negotiations:
[T]he attorney must be credited with some authority for
negotiating with the opposing party, and in the course of such
negotiations it becomes necessary to make communications and
to deliver documents or copies which ...may afterwards with
propriety form the subject of proof as part of the transactions
between the parties. Indeed, to refuse to examine them would
often be to sanction the breaking of faith with the opponent. 41
Dean Wigmore further asserts:

42. Id.§ 61, at 480-81.
43. Id.§61 cmt.d,at481.
44. Id.§ 61 cmt. b, at 480-81.
45. Id. § 61 Reporter's Note cmt. b, at 482.
46. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS

AT COMMON LAW

§

2325, at 632 (John T.

McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).

47. Id.
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Since the attorney has implied authority from the client.., to
make admissions and otherwise to act in all that concerns the
management of the cause, all disclosures (oral or written)
voluntarily made to the opposing party or to third persons in the
course of negotiations for settlement, or in the course of taking
adverse steps in litigation (e.g., in serving notices), are receivable
as being made under an implied waiver of privilege, giving
authority to disclose the confidences when necessary in the
opinion of the attorney."
In short, like the comments to the Model Rules and Restatement provisions,
Dean Wigmore's text stops short of giving even a hypothetical example of an
attorney affirmatively introducing privileged information at trial. Further, after
defending his position, Dean Wigmore concedes that "[t]he judicial rulings are in
some confusion."49
D. ConstitutionalLaw
Like the evidence doctrine, constitutional law is germane to this Article's topic.
On occasion, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the accused must
personally make certain trial-related decisions. In New York v. Hill,0 the Court
stated that "[flor certain fundamental [constitutional] rights, the defendant must
personally make an informed waiver." 5' The Court has forcefully held that only the
accused has a constitutional right to testify,52 and the emphatic nature of the Court's
language has convinced the lower courts that only the accused may choose whether
to testify; the defense counsel may not usurp that decision." The decision whether
to waive the right to trial by petit jury falls into the same category. 4 Further, the
Court has either held or implied that the accused must personally make several other
choices, including whether to move to suppress evidence on the ground that it is
a product of a constitutional violation 6 and whether to move to dismiss an
indictment due to racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.57 The
Court has never suggested, much less ruled, however, that the accused must
personally decide whether to waive a non-constitutional evidentiary privilege.
Thus, in the current state of constitutional law, a jurisdiction apparently could
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Starkey, supra note 4, at 740 (citing People v. Vargas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88 (Ct.
App. 1975) as authority for the following: "Nor may counsel, during the inquiry concerning the reasons
for defendant's absence, properly disclose communications from his client which arose out of the
attorney-client relationship and which were clearly meant to be confidential.").
50. 528 U.S. 110 (2000).

51. Id. at 114. The Court gave the examples of the right to counsel and the right to plead not
guilty.
52. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 passim (1987).
53. EDWARD J.IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE
AccusED's CONSTITUTIONALRIGHTTO INTRODUCEFAVORABLEEVIDENCE § 4-2.a(l), at 133 n.30 (3d
ed. 2004).

54. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 22.1(h), at 1041-43 (4th ed. 2000) (summarizing Patton and other similar case law).
55. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,745 (1983) (holding the defendant has the ultimate

authority to make certain decisions); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) ("[O]nce a
defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which
must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney.").
56. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977).
57. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 537-38, 542 (1976).
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confer that authority on a defense counsel representing an accused being tried in
absentia. The mere fact that a practice would be constitutional, though, does not
dictate the conclusion that the practice is either necessary or even desirable.
None of these bodies of law supplies a clear-cut answer to the policy question
posed in Marcum. Consequently, to answer that question, this Article must
undertake an original analysis of the merits of the issue. Part III of this Article
assays that analysis.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE LAWYER
REPRESENTING A CLIENT BEING TRIED INABSENTIA SHOULD BE GRANTED THE
POWER TO WAIVE THE CLIENT'S ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

As the Introduction noted, the question presented by United States v. Marcum"8
is seemingly a narrow one. Yet, before that question can be intelligently evaluated,
several much larger issues warrant examination. Subpart A addresses the threshold
question of what constitutional rights an accused ordinarily possesses, and subpart
B shifts to the thornier question of which rights the accused forfeits by voluntarily
absenting himself or herself from trial. Moreover, subpart B concludes that the
accused does not forfeit the right to introduce exculpatory testimony at the trial in
absentia. Subpart C then turns to the ultimate question of whether the lawyer
representing the accused tried in absentiais a proper surrogate for deciding whether
to exercise the right, even when doing so entails the waiver of the accused's
attorney-client privilege.
A.

The ConstitutionalTrial Rights an Accused Normally Possesses

Any discussion of which rights the accused being tried in absentia retains
requires identification of the rights which an accused normally possesses. 9 Many
of those normally possessed rights are set out in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In pertinent part, the amendment reads as follows: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... public trial, by an
impartial jury . . .; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
compulsory process for obtaining
6
of Counsel for his defense." '
The Sixth Amendment thus guarantees the accused several types of rights, one
being the right to counsel. 62 The Assistance of Counsel provision is a two-way
street. On the one hand, the accused citizen is entitled to receive assistance from
the lawyer. The accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in" a
criminal proceeding.63 On the other hand, to the extent that he or she can, the
accused is entitled to assist counsel" by, for example, providing counsel with
investigative leads for exculpatory evidence.

58. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
59. Willis, supra note 2, at 104-12.

60. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-44 (1963) (holding that a defendant's
fundamental right to counsel also applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).

63. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see also I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at
344 (John William Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("[T]hey require the assistance of expert lawyers.").
64. Cohen, supra note 4, at 279; Starkey, supra note 4, at 731.
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Assisted by his or her lawyer, what Sixth Amendment rights may the accused
assert at trial? Some of the rights are negative in nature; in one way or another, they
allow the defense team to attack prosecution evidence. These rights derive from the
Confrontation Clause guarantee. For instance, when the prosecution's witnesses
testify, they must ordinarily do so in the accused's presence. The testimony is a
face-to-face confrontation with the accused, which may unsettle a perjurious witness
for the prosecution and prompt the witness to display demeanor leading the jury to
question the witness's credibility.6" The Confrontation Clause not only gives the
accused a right to passively observe the prosecution's witnesses; the Clause also
subsumes a right to actively cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. In Davis
v. Alaska,66 the Supreme Court underscored the importance of that right. In that
case, the accused wanted to cross-examine the star prosecution witness to expose
the witness's bias. In part, the inference of bias arose from the fact that at the time
of trial, the witness was still on probation for a juvenile offense.67 The rub was that
a state statute and court rule barred any inquiry about juvenile adjudications. 6' The
Court acknowledged that there is a legitimate, important state interest in cloaking
juvenile court proceedings with confidentiality. 6 Yet, the Court ruled that the
accused's right to cross-examination was paramount, trumping the statute and court
rule.70

Although the Confrontation Clause's right to cross-examination is a
fundamental one, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused far more than negative
rights to attack the prosecution's evidence. The Sixth Amendment constitutionalizes
the ideal of a fair, adversarial hearing at which the defense can present its
perspective of the case. 7' For instance, the accused's personal right to testify is of
a constitutional dimension.72 More broadly-and of greater interest for the present
inquiry-the accused has a right to introduce favorable exculpatory evidence at
trial.
The seminal case recognizing this right is the Supreme Court's 1967 decision
in Washington v. Texas." Washington was charged with murder, and at trial, he
attempted to call Charles Fuller as a witness. As a defense offer of proof indicated,
Fuller was prepared to testify that Washington endeavored to prevent Fuller from
committing the homicide. Fuller had already been convicted of the homicide,
though, and two state statutes precluded an accused from calling as a witness
anyone who had either been charged with or convicted as coparticipants of the same
crime. After the Court denied Fuller's testimony to Washington, a jury convicted
Washington, and ultimately, he appealed to the United States Supreme Court.74

65. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) ("We have recognized ... that faceto-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that a witness will
wrongfully implicate an innocent person."); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) ("The
Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may
studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.").
66. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).

67. Id. at311.
68. Id.
69. Id. at319.

70. Id. at 320. See IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 53, § 8-7.
71. See generally IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supranote 53, at 26-40 (discussing the evolution
and historical background of the Sixth Amendment and the various theories for the constitutional right
to present defense evidence).
72. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,61 (1987) (holding that testimonyby a defendant that has

been recalled after hypnosis is not per se unreliable).
73. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).

74. Id. at 17.
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When the case reached the Court, Chief Justice Warren issued two significant
rulings. The first was that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
incorporates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process guarantee and renders the
guarantee directly enforceable against the states. 75 The second was that in addition
to enjoying the express Compulsory Process guarantee, the accused has an implied
'
Texas had argued that
Sixth Amendment right to "offer [exculpatory] testimony."76
it satisfied Washington's Compulsory Process rights by giving Washington process
to compel Fuller's attendance at trial. Texas merely denied Washington the right
to put Fuller on the stand and elicit his favorable testimony. Texas urged a literal
reading of the clause, entitling the accused only to compulsory process. The Court
refused to adopt such a narrow reading of the clause. Writing for the majority, the
Chief Justice declared the following:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present
a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts
as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to
establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due
process of law.77
In sum, the accused not only has a defensive right to attack inculpatory
prosecution evidence, but the accused also possesses a positive right to introduce
exculpatory testimony.
B. The ConstitutionalRights of an Accused Being Tried In Absentia-The
Rights Which the Accused Forfeitsand Those Which the Accused Retains
Assuming that an accused is being tried in absentia,the accused has certain
constitutional rights that he or she obviously cannot exercise. For example, while
the accused typically has a right to assist his or her counsel, the absent accused is
not able to exercise this right. 8 Nor can the absent accused avail himself or herself
of face-to-face confrontation with the prosecution's witnesses.79 Finally, the absent
accused cannot personally testify in his or her own defense.8" The accused
necessarily loses these rights by absconding from the trial. If the trial continues in
the accused's absence, as the law permits, it is physically impossible for the accused
to exercise these rights.
The question remains: Which other trial rights, if any, has the accused lost in
the event the trial continues? Importantly, if the accused has lost the Sixth
Amendment right to present exculpatory evidence, the question posed in United
States v. Marcum8 becomes moot in a sense. If the defense no longer has a right

75. Id. at 17-19.
76. Id. at 18 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
77. Id. at 18.
78. Cohen, supra note 4, at 279, 283.
79. United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11 th Cir. 1995); Cohen, supra note 4, at 279;
Starkey, supra note 4, at 735.
80. Starkey, supra note 4, at 735, 740-41; Willis, supranote 2, at 117.
81. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
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to introduce favorable evidence, the trial judge need not reach the issue of whether
the defense counsel may waive the accused's attorney-client privilege applicable to
the evidence. Thejudge should exclude the evidence on the ground that the defense
is no longer entitled to introduce evidence. The waiver issue arises only if the
defense counsel otherwise has the right to introduce the statement to which the
privilege attaches. Has the absent accused waived or forfeited his or her other
constitutional rights, including the affirmative right to introduce exculpatory

evidence?
C. Waiver
In 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst,"2 the United States Supreme Court coined the

classic definition of true waiver: the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment

of a known right."83 In a subsequent decision, Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte,"4 the

Court confined that strict definition of waiver to trial rights.85 The Johnson
definition is applicable, however, because this Article's focus is rights retained by
an accused being tried in absentia. If that definition is rigorously applied to the
facts of many in absentiatrials, waiver will be difficult to fird. Unless the accused

was notified of both his trial rights and the fact that his absence would not prevent
the trial from continuing, 6 the court will be hard-pressed to conclude that a waiver
in the strict, Johnson sense exists.

D. The DistinctionBetween Waiver and Forfeiture
The analysis continues because courts have long distinguished between true
waiver and forfeiture. 7 In the case of a convicted accused who flees after initiating
an appeal, a wealth of authority indicates that the court may dismiss the appeal
under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 8 Under the doctrine, the fugitive forfeits

82. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
83. Id. at 464; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting the Johnson
definition of a waiver); Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver ofConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1970) (noting that a waiver must be "consensual" and that some
"procedural incidents of the criminal process" cannot be waived).
84. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
85. Id. at 235-46.
86. See Starkey, supranote 4, at 736; Willis, supra note 2, at 117.
87. United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Sealed Case, 356 F.3d
313, 317-18 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Jacques, 345 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Johnson, 289 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837,
841 (7th Cir. 2001); Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2000); United
States v. Davenport, 151 F.3d 1325, 1328 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998); Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1420 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 n.6 (I Ith Cir.
1995); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d
792, 799 n.l (10th Cir. 1986).
88. See United States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, 366 F.3d 1058,1064 (9th Cir. 2004); Lynn v. United
States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1239-44 (11 th Cir. 2004); United States v. Awadalla, 357 F.3d 243, 245 (2d
Cir. 2004); Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 n.21 (9th Cir. 1997); Daccarett-Ghia v.
Comm'r, 70 F.3d 621, 622-23, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Real Prop. Located at Incline
Vill., 47 F.3d 1511, 1515 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (9th
Cir. 1994); Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610,611-12 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Glomb, 877
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Puzzanghera, 820 F.2d 25, 26 (1 st Cir. 1987); United States
v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (11 th Cir. 1982); Lewis v. Duckworth, 680 F.2d 508, 509 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60,67 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. James,
621 F.2d 588,589 (3d Cir. 1980); Joensen v. Wainwright, 615 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 1980); Taylor
v. Egeler, 575 F.2d 773, 773 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 437-38 (9th Cir.
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all of his of her appellate rights. At first blush, an extensive forfeiture appears more
defensible at the trial level. The appellant's absence has little or no practical impact
on the appeal since the appeal is largely confined to the already-completed trial
record. In contrast, at trial the accused can make a meaningful contribution to the
defense by testifying and providing investigative leads. If an appellant's absence
justifies dismissing the appeal and forfeiting the procedural rights the appellant
would otherwise enjoy, perhaps the accused's absence at trial should have a similar
effect.

Two major differences exist between the trial and appellate settings. First, in
the case of an appellant, the trial has provided a formal, presumably reliable
determination of guilt. Second, as subpart B explains, although the accused at trial
would otherwise have many constitutional rights, no constitutional right to an

appeal exists. 9 Thus, the loss of an accused's appellate right does not have the

same constitutional implications as a loss of the same accused's trial rights.
What standard governs the propriety of the accused's forfeiture of trial rights?
Professor Peter Westen's analysis takes the best approach to this question.90
Westen distinguishes a true Johnson waiver, which depends on a showing of
subjective intent, from forfeiture, which occurs by operation of law without regard
to the accused's state of mind.9 To formulate the forfeiture test, Westen primarily
draws on the Supreme Court's decisions addressing the extent to which an
accused's guilty plea effects a forfeiture. 2 Synthesizing those cases, Westen states
that an accused's conduct should work a forfeiture only when that conduct is

1976); United States v. Villegas-Codallos, 543 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1976); Ruetz v. Lash, 500
F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (7th Cir. 1974); Brinlee v. United States, 483 F.2d 925, 926 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Sanchez, 258 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Lewis v. Del. State Hosp., 490
F. Supp. 177, 181-82 (D. Del. 1980); People v. Buffalo, 123 Cal. Rptr. 308, 309 (Ct. App. 1975); State
v. Peck, 652 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Wayne v. State, 579 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979). But see Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 251 (1993) (noting that if an
accused's "flight and recapture" occurs prior to appeal, it may not be sufficient grounds for dismissal).
89. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S.
317, 323 (1976); Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975); Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 76 (2d
Cir. 1998); Miller v. Smith, 99 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147,
148 (4th Cir. 1995); Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rutan, 956
F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Matista, 932 F.2d 1055, 1056 (2d Cir. 1991); Simmons
v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Parrish, 887 F.2d 1107, 1108 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Barnes v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 336,340 (5th Cir. 1987); Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d
263,264 (2d Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Burton v. Greer, 643 F.2d 466,469-70 (7th Cir. 1981);
Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297,302 (5th Cir.
1980); Joensen v. Wainwright, 615 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346,
354 (9th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. McCaughtry, 291 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Sinatra v.
Barkley, 741 F. Supp. 39,40 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Mirrer v. Smyley, 703 F. Supp. 10, 12 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
without opinion, 876 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1989); Jones v. Michigan, 525 F. Supp. 636, 641 (E.D. Mich.
1981), aff'd without opinion, 705 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982); Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F. Supp. 685,
713 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'd sub nora. Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Va.
State Dept. of Corrections, 462 F. Supp. 164, 165 (W.D. Va. 1978); People v. Vargas, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 661,663 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Baltor, 143 Cal. Rptr. 478,481 (Ct. App. 1978); Pierce v. State,
636 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App. 1982). But see Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the ConstitutionalRight
to a CriminalAppeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992) (arguing that a constitutional right to a criminal
appeal should be included in the due process clause based on history and modem usage).
90. Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationalefor the Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights
in CriminalProcedure,75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977); see 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 24.2(c),
at 461-62 n.37 (citing Professor Westen's article to explain the difference between forfeiture and
waiver).
91. Westen, supra note 90, at 1214.
92. See id. at 1215-47.
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detrimental to the prosecution's litigating position.93 Thus, guilty pleas forfeit most
of the accused's trial rights because the plea can impair the government's ability to
prove the accused's guilt at trial.94 Suppose the accused initially pleads guilty but
is later permitted to withdraw the plea. In the interim, the "trail of evidence [may
have] grown cold."9 5 Between unpreserved evidence and eroded memories, the
prosecution may not be in a position to prove the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial.96 In short, the prosecution is no longer in the same
position in its case against the accused;97 but if the accused's conduct does not place
the prosecution in a diminished position to establish guilt, that conduct should not
result in a forfeiture. 9"

The application of Professor Westen's standard to an in absentia trial dictates
the conclusion that, while the accused has necessarily lost rights such as the right
to assist counsel and personally testify, the accused's absence does not justify a
forfeiture of other trial rights. If the accused is absent, not only is the prosecution
in no worse position to prove the accused's guilt, but the prosecution is realistically
in a better position.
Conceivably, in a rare case, the accused's absence would disadvantage the
prosecution. Identity is the key issue in many cases. For example, consider a case
where someone clearly committed a criminal act with the requisite mens rea. The
only issue remaining is whether the accused was the perpetrator. In most of those
cases, the prosecution has a variety of means to establish the accused's identity:
DNA, fingerprints, or at least an eyewitness's identification of a photograph of the
accused, for example. Assume an extraordinary fact situation, however, in which
the only method of establishing the accused's identity is an eyewitness's in-court
identification of the accused. The government should have a fair opportunity to
establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator.99 Arguably, the accused's
absence ought to have a waiver effect. (Even in this case, though, it is difficult to
believe that a court would find that the accused has forfeited any right to a hearing
adjudicating guilt. At early common law, however, if an accused absconded before
a conviction, the accused was "subject to summary execution by anyone who came
upon him."'" That treatment occurred only after the accused had been declared an
outlaw, and the declaration substituted for a conviction).'0 '
While such fact situations turning on the issue of identity are conceivable, no
published opinions exist presenting such extreme facts. In any realistic in absentia
trial, the prosecution is certainly no worse off. It is true that the prosecution is
denied the accused's testimony, but the prosecution is not entitled to that testimony.
Under the Fifth Amendment, the accused has a privilege to refuse to testify at
trial. 2 Further, the prosecution cannot rely on the accused's unfavorable
appearance or nonverbal, non-testimonial demeanor at trial to bolster its case. The
only demeanor the trier may properly consider is a witness's demeanor on the stand

93. Id. at 1237.
94. Id. at 1235-36.
95. Id. at 1248.

96. Id. at 1238, 1248-49.
97. See Westen, supra note 90, at 1248.
98. See id. at 1236, 1248.
99. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 190.
100. Starkey, supra note 4, at 722-23.

101. See id.
102. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
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during testimony.' °3 Thus, the only demeanor the prosecutor could discuss during
closing argument would be the demeanor of the accused while testifying. Further,
since the accused has a right to refuse to testify, the prosecution is not entitled to
present demeanor evidence to the trier of fact if the accused elects not to testify.
The accused's absence, however, does not have any negative impact on the
prosecution's ability to introduce the accused's pretrial statements because the
prosecution can still introduce any relevant"° statement as an admission of a partyopponent.' 5 When a hearsay statement qualifies as an admission, it is immaterial
whether the declarant is available at trial."
In the typical case, the accused's absence makes it easier for the prosecution to
obtain a conviction. First, the accused's absence will reduce the amount of
evidence potentially available to the defense"0 7 because the accused's absence
necessarily deprives the defense of the accused's personal testimony. Second, the
accused's absence deprives the defense and the factfmder access to the accused's
knowledge about the case."8 If the accused has exclusive knowledge of the
existence of a potential defense witness, that witness may never appear on behalf
of the defense. Moreover, the accused will not be present to furnish the defense
counsel with investigative leads.
Not only may the defense have less evidence, but the prosecution may have
more, or even superior evidence. Admittedly, if the facts indicate only the
accused's unexplained absence, the trial judge may forbid conclusions of guilt to
be drawn from the absence."1 9 Suppose, though, that the prosecution has evidence
to support an inference that the accused fled the jurisdiction. Given those facts,
ample authority indicates that the prosecution is entitled to characterize the
accused's conduct as evidence of consciousness of guilt," ° and the judge may
instruct the jury accordingly.'I

103. Edward J. lmwinkelried, DemeanorImpeachment: Law and Tactics, 9 AM. J. TRIAL. ADV.
183, 196-201 (1985); see also Cohen, supranote 3, at 181 ("Thejury ought to base its decision on the
testimony and the exhibits, not on the accused's physical characteristics.").
104. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1102, at 348 (3d
ed. 1998).
105. Id. § 1104, at 349-51.
106. See id. § 1312, at 456. Compare FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing hearsay exceptions requiring
a foundational showing of unavailability) with FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (codifying the hearsay
exemption for personal admissions).
107. Conceivably, a creative defense attorney could argue that the accused's absence constitutes
unavailability, triggering the application of a hearsay exception to an otherwise inadmissible pretrial
statement by the accused. The chance that a court would accept such an argument is remote. On
occasion, defense counsel have successfully contended that an accused's invocation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to testify rendered the accused unavailable. Bryan v. State, 837 S.W.2d
637, 643-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). But, the prevailing view is to the contrary. United States v.
Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kimball, 15 F.3d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir.
1994). Most courts follow the prevailing view even though, in this variation of the facts, the accused
is lawfully asserting a privilege. When the accused absconds from trial, his conduct could amount to
a crime. Even if the conduct fell short of constituting a separate offense, it is difficult to see how the
defense could satisfy any provision of Federal Rule 804(a) specifying the recognized forms of
unavailability. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
108. Cohen, supra note 4, at 283, 285.
109. 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 430, at 813 (13th ed. 1991).
Moreover, if the facts indicate that the accused's absence is unexplained, it is debatable whether a trial
in absentia is even permissible. See authorities cited supra notes 2-3.
110. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 3:04 (rev. ed. 1999);

MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, 643.08[2]; Starkey, supranote 4, at 737; Cohen, supra note 3, at 118.
111. MOORE ETAL., supra note 3,1643.08[2] n.25 (citing United States v. Touchstone, 726 F.2d
1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1984)); Starkey, supra note 4, at 736-39.
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The accused's absence may improve the quality of some prosecutorial evidence,
and increase the quantity of evidence the prosecution can present. Layjurors appear
to attach a good deal of weight to witnesses' nonverbal demeanor."' In many
jurisdictions, the trial judge expressly instructs the jury that in evaluating a witness's
credibility, they may consider the witness's demeanor while testifying." 3 In some
cases, however, the accused's presence can make a prosecution witness so
uncomfortable that the discomfort will manifest itself as unfavorable demeanor
thereby leading the jury to the wrong conclusion. Suppose, for example, that the
witness is the child victim of sexual abuse committed by the accused. If the witness
is forced to testify in the accused's presence, the witness may testify less
effectively;" 4 even if a truthful witness retains enough composure to fully answer
the prosecutor's questions, the witness's nonverbal demeanor may cause the jurors
to disbelieve the witness. The United States Supreme Court has announced that, in
some instances, the Confrontation Clause must yield when the prosecutor can show
that face-to-face confrontation with the accused will probably have a severe impact
on the witness. "5 When the prosecution has made a satisfactory showing, the courts
have sanctioned such procedures as closed-circuit television and screens.' 16 The
demeanor of such vulnerable witnesses is likely to be more confident at trial when
the accused is absent or not visible. As a result, jurors will more likely fred the
witness's demeanor more convincing than it would otherwise be in a face-to-face
confrontation.
Hence, rather than reducing the prosecution's ability to establish the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in most instances the accused's absence will make
it easier for the prosecution to achieve a guilty verdict. The defense counsel may
have less exculpatory evidence at his or her disposal, and the accused's conduct in
absconding may furnish the prosecution with "consciousness of guilt" evidence and
improve the demeanor of some prosecution witnesses. In light of Professor
Westen's analysis, the accused's absence should therefore not work a forfeiture of
most of the accused's trial rights. The accused has necessarily lost the right to
testify personally, but his or her absence should not forfeit either the accused's

112. See, e.g., Arthur D. Austin, Why JurorsDon't Heed the Trial, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1985,
at 15, 18 (discussing research findings of the Cleveland Jury Project and the need for reform); see
generallyJeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity ofDemeanor
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993) (discussing the popular

confidence indemeanor evidence and why it is problematic); Imwinkelried, supra note 103 (analyzing
the impeachment value of a witness's unfavorable demeanor); The Honorable James P. Timothy,
Demeanor Credibility,49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903 (2000) (examining the jury's use of demeanor to
assess witness credibility); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991)

(summarizing experimental findings that indicate demeanor evidence is insufficient to assist the trier
of fact, and the implications of these findings on rules and practices).
113. Imwinkelried, supra note 103, at 229.
114. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 915 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that to

require "the child to testify in the presence of the defendant ... will prevent the child from

communicating at trial" even though she is able to differentiate between telling the truth and telling a
lie).

115. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) ("We likewise conclude today that
a state's interest in the physical and psychological well-being ofchild abuse victims maybe sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.").
116. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 104, § 109; see also Craig,497 U.S. at 853 n.2 (listing
thirty-seven states and corresponding statutory authority that permit videotaped testimony of sexually
abused children); id. at 853-54 n.3 (listing twenty-four states and corresponding statutory authority that
permit closed circuit television in child abuse cases); id. at 854 n.4 (listing eight states and
corresponding statutory authority that permit the use of a two-way video system for both the witness
and the defendant in the courtroom).
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Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine, or the accused's Compulsory Process
right to introduce favorable evidence. A new question then arises: In the accused's
absence, who will decide whether and how to exercise those right?
E. The Defense Attorney as a Suitable Surrogate to Exercise the
ConstitutionalRights Retained by the Accused Being Tried In Absentia
Assume the court concludes that by absenting himself or herself, the accused
has not forfeited the valuable constitutional rights to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses and to present defense evidence." 7 Who will serve as the accused's
surrogate to decide whether to exercise those rights?

117. Even the conclusion by the court that forfeiture has not occurred does not resolve the
question of the extent of those retained rights. There are two possible models: constitutional law and
evidence law. Under the constitutional law model, whoever is authorized to act as the accused's
surrogate may exercise the rights only to the extent constitutionally mandated. For example, although
the accused has a basic constitutional right to cross-examine a prosecution witness to expose the
witness's bias, that right does not require the trial judge to permit any cross-examination relevant to the
witness's bias. IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 53, § 8-7c, at 282-84 (the trial judge enjoys
"a great deal of leeway" in determining the proper scope of cross-examination). In particular, thejudge
may restrict cross-examination about a particular source of bias when the record contains other
evidence allowing the jurors to adequately gauge the witness's credibility. Id. § 8-7c, at 287-92.
Likewise, while the accused has an implied Sixth Amendment right to introduce exculpatory testimony,
the testimony must be both demonstrably reliable, id. § 2-4a(2), and critical, id. § 2-4a(l). The
determination whether the specific item of evidence is critical turns in part on the defense's access to
other, alternative evidence. Id.
Assume arguendo that thejudge conducting an in absentiatrial strictly followed a constitutionallaw paradigm for the hearing. On that assumption, the judge might have to constantly interrupt the trial
to conduct sidebar conferences. The conferences would be necessary to determine whether there was
so little other impeaching evidence that the Confrontation Clause mandated cross-examination about
the specific impeaching fact, or whether there was so little other favorable evidence that the
Compulsory Process guarantee required the admission ofthe particular exculpatory fact proffered. As
the preceding paragraph indicates, in deciding whether the facts trigger the Confrontation Clause or
Compulsory Process Clause, thejudge must consider both the proffered defense evidence and the other
evidence available to the defense. That procedure would be awkward and time-consuming.
Precisely because the constitutional law procedure seems so unwieldy, the second, evidence-law
model is attractive. Under that model, defense counsel may cross-examine even when the Confrontation
Clause does not require cross-examination to that extent; counsel may introduce favorable evidence
even though the Compulsory Process guarantee does not compel its admission. In other words, at trial
the accused's surrogate may question witnesses to the extent the governing statutory and common-law
rules of evidence permit.
In practice, the courts that hear in absentiacases seem to have adopted the evidence-law model.
None of the published opinions dealing with in absentiacases indicates that the presiding trial judges
have paused to determine whether a cross-examination subject was so vital that the Confrontation
Clause required allowing questioning on that topic, or whether the proffered defense evidence was so
critical that its exclusion would run afoul of the Compulsory Process guarantee. Instead, the cases
suggest that a court would permit defense counsel to conduct the trial in the same manner as he or she
would have if the accused had been present. In the words ofDiaz v. UnitedStates, 223 U.S. 442, 455
(1912), the trial proceeds "in like manner... as if [the accused] were present." Hence, the authorities
indicate that in the normal fashion, defense counsel representing accused being tried in absentia have
been afforded the opportunity to: (1) conduct voir dire examination, see Willis, supranote 2, at 115;
(2) present an opening statement, see People v. Smith, 721 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Il. 1999); (3) crossexamine prosecution witnesses, see Diaz, 223 U.S. at 445; Willis, supra note 2, at 115; (4) introduce
evidence, see Diaz, 223 U.S. at 464; (5) participate injury views, see People v. Edwards, 73 P. 416,
417 (Cal. 1903); and (6) present a closing argument, see Diaz, 223 U.S. at 460.
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The Defense Counsel's GeneralSuitability as a Surrogate

The possibility exists that the law would designate a third party other than the
defense attorney as the surrogate for the accused. This Article asserts that the
defense attorney is the most appropriate surrogate for several reasons.
Regardless of who serves as the surrogate, in order to make intelligent decisions
about the presentation of evidence at trial, the surrogate should be familiar with the
overall trial strategy and the role that particular exculpatory and impeaching facts
can play in that strategy. The defense attorney is in the best position to develop that
familiarity.
Moreover, even if the accused were present, the defense attorney would have
some authority to make decisions about the cross-examination conducted and the
evidence presented at trial. Several American Bar Association documents
acknowledge that authority. One example is Model Rule of Professional Conduct

1.2(a):
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
shall consult with the client
objectives of representation and, ....
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may
take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized
to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify."'
Although the Rule expressly states that the client has the final authority to
decide whether to personally testify, the Rule implies that the attorney has final
authority to decide other evidentiary matters. The notes to Rule 1.2 following the
1981 Proposed Final Draft cite cases that support this inference. Thus, the notes
state that the attorney is empowered to decide "whether to cross-examine a
[prosecution] witness,""' 9 whether to "present or refuse to present certain
witnesses,""' and whether to "stipulate to certain facts,"'' including a stipulation
as "to the use of testimony from a prior trial."' 22
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice also reflect an
attorney's decision-making authority. 23 Like Model Rule 1.2, the 1993 Defense
Function Standard 4-5.2(a)(iv) asserts that the accused has final authority to decide
"whether to testify in his or her own behalf.' 24 Defense Function Standard 45.2(b) adds the following:
Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense
counsel after consultation with the client where feasible and

118. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2004).

119. MODELRULEsOFPROF'LCONDUCTR.I.2 note (Proposed Final Draft 1981) ("decline crossexamination") (citing United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
120. Id. (citing Nahhas v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 13 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961),
Newman v. L.A. Transit Lines, 262 P.2d 95 (Ca. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), and In re King, 336 A.2d 195
(Vt. 1975)).
121. Id. (citing Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv. Inc., 263 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959)).
122. Id. (citing Smith v. Whittier, 30 P. 529 (Cal. 1892)).
123. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35.
124. Id.
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appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to
accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and what
evidence should be introduced.'2 5
Like the American Bar Association's ethical and practice standards, several
Supreme Court opinions acknowledge that, as a general proposition, the defense
counsel has decision-making authority with respect to many trial-related matters,
including evidence. As Part II.D of this Article discussed, the Court has declared
that only the accused can effectively waive a particular constitutional right. The
Court has simultaneously noted that other trial-related decisions fall within the
defense counsel's province. 26 New York v. Hill27 is illustrative. Part II.D quoted
the passage in Hill in which the Court stressed that only the accused has the power
to waive certain constitutional rights. 128 Yet, in its next breath, the Court hastened
to make the following observation:
For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action
of counsel .... [Diecisions by counsel are generally given effect
as to what arguments to pursue, ... what evidentiary objections to

raise, ...

and what agreements to conclude regarding the

admission of evidence .

.

.

.

Absent a demonstration of

129
ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last.

At trial, it is usually more effective for any litigant, including a criminal
accused, to make a consistent, coherent presentation to the trier of fact. 30 If, at
various points in the trial, a litigant takes inconsistent positions, the inconsistency
can lead the trier to question the general credibility of the litigant's position. As we
have seen, with the exception of the evidentiary question of whether to present the
accused's own testimony, even when the accused is present, the accused's attorney
has authority to resolve most evidentiary questions related to the defense trial
strategy. Hence, selecting a surrogate other than the accused's attorney would
create the risk of introducing an inconsistency into the defense trial strategy.
2. The Defense Counsel's Suitability as a Surrogatefor the Specific
Purpose ofDeciding Whether to Waive an EvidentiaryPrivilege
Of course, the specific question presented is whether the defense counsel
should be empowered to waive the accused's evidentiary privileges. As discussed
125. Id.
126. Cf.Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (discussing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), in which the Court held that "[t]o counteract the natural tendency to fault an
unsuccessful defense, a court receiving a claim of ineffective assistance must 'indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide rage of reasonable professional assistance."').
Even Justice Brennan, an ardent a civil libertarian, conceded that the trial defense attorney must be
granted "decisive authority... with regard to the hundreds of decisions that must be made quickly in
the course of a trial." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. 528 U.S. 110(2000).
128. Id. at 114.
129. Id. at 114-15 (internal citations omitted).
130. See generally RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 28-49 (3d ed. 2002) (suggesting how to plan a case
"strategically and tactically" through the choice of a trial theory and trial theme so as to "achieve a
simple, coherent trial presentation").
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above, the defense attorney possesses extensive authority over the general run of
evidentiary questions arising at trial. Yet, the decision whether to waive an
evidentiary privilege differs from the general evidentiary issue. Most evidentiary
doctrines relate to the reliability of the testimony submitted to the trier of fact."
From the litigant's perspective, the only question may be whether the item of
evidence will appear so trustworthy to the trier of fact that the trier is motivated to
return a favorable verdict based on the evidence.' 3 2 In the vast majority of
instances, the defense attorney is at least as competent as the accused to resolve that
question.
Whether to waive an evidentiary privilege or not involves a very difficult
calculation. Unlike doctrines such as authentication and hearsay, privileges rest in
large part on considerations of extrinsic social policy.'33 The introduction of
privileged information can affect not only the probability that the holder will prevail
in the litigation, but the use of the information also implicates the holder's right to
personal autonomy.'34 In a given case, the holder might prize personal autonomy
so strongly that he or she decides to assert the privilege even though doing so
reduces the probability that the holder will prevail in the litigation. Counsel,
though, may know little or nothing about how the holder values privacy interests.
Thus, no one can say with certainty that the defense attorney is as competent as the
accused to resolve this question.
Nevertheless, on balance, the defense counsel representing an accused tried in
absentia should be authorized to waive the privilege. Several factors cut in favor
of that conclusion. Initially, the defense attorney already possesses some authority
with respect to the accused's personal privileges. If the attorney was the original
recipient of the privileged communication, the law confers on the attorney the
power to assert the privilege on the accused's behalf. In 1998, in Swidler & Berlin
v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court allowed an attorney to invoke
the privilege on behalf of his client. Further, the original draft of the Federal Rule
of Evidence 503(c) stated, "The person who was the lawyer at the time of the
communication may claim the privilege... on behalf of the client."1 36 California
Evidence Code Section 954(c) grants the attorney the same authority.'37
Although the view that the attorney has authority to assert the privilege on the
client holder's behalf is virtually universal, the existence of the authority does not
dictate the conclusion that the attorney should also have the authority to waive the
privilege. Privilege law empowers several classes of persons to claim a privilege
on the holder's behalf,' but as a general proposition, only the holder is capable of
waiving the privilege.'39 An exception to this general proposition is that the
attorney has some implied power to waive the privilege in connection with the
management of the litigation. As Part II demonstrated, the rules of both legal ethics
and agency permit the attorney to make necessary waivers during settlement

131. I IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 3.
132. CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 130, § 7.2(c), at 167-70.
133. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 46, at v; 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 3.
134. 1 IMWiNKELRIED, supra note 1, § 5.3.3.
135. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).

136. FED. R. EVID. 503(c) (deleted), reprinted in 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rejected Rule 503, at 38 (1986).
137. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954(c) (West 1991).
138. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 6.5.3.
139. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 6.12.3.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10 [Vol. 56: 509
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

negotiations."4 As we noted, though, those rules have only a limited impact
because in many, if not most, cases another exclusionary rule of evidence 141 comes
into play to preclude the later use of the disclosed information against the client.
More importantly, however, it is well settled that at trial, counsel's failure to
interpose a proper privilege objection can waive the client's privilege.'42 At trial,
counsel's omission binds the client even if counsel lacks the client's express
consent. 143 The omission is binding even if counsel acted negligently without
making a thoughtful, deliberate decision to waive.
To some extent, conceding that limited authority to the attorney is necessitated
by trial administration policies. Privileges often must be asserted at trial, and
neither the holder nor the holder's counsel may have been able to anticipate the
proffer of the privileged testimony. In that event, the defense may have to decide
whether to assert or waive in the brief interim-a matter of seconds-between the
conclusion of the question calling for the privileged information and the beginning
of the answer disclosing the information.44 As a practical matter, before objecting,
there may not be enough time for the counsel both to recognize the potential
privilege objection and to consult with the client as to whether to waive the
privilege. If the client's consent were necessary in such cases, the admission of
privileged information would be error in a large number of cases, and privilege
issues would multiply on appeal. Thus, there would be a sort of logic to binding the
client by the counsel's inadvertent omissions while denying the counsel the power
to intentionally waive the holder's privilege. In the final analysis, however, counsel
representing an accused being tried in absentia, at least, should be granted that
latter, further power to waive privilege.
3. A ThirdParty's GeneralSuitability as a Surrogate
The counsel in this situation is more qualified than some third parties who
already wield that power. Probate is a context in which a third party might possess
this power. In a number ofjurisdictions, after the death of a natural person holding
privilege, the holder's privilege passes by operation of law to the personal
representative of the decedent's estate. 4 California Evidence Code section 953
is illustrative.'" Subdivision (c) of that statute designates "[tlhe personal
representative of the client [as the holder] if the client is dead."' 47 The decedent can
nominate a person as the executor or executrix of the decedent's will. 48 When the
decedent fails to nominate someone, the court appoints a representative as
administrator or administratrix.149 Some state statutes governing appointment give

140. 1 ScoTr N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.46, at 1-122 (2d
ed. 1995).
141. FED. R. EVID. 408-10.
142. 2 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE INTHE UNITED STATES § 9:2, at 11, § 9:10,
at 26-28 (2d ed. 1999); PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES

§ 2:27, at 151-52 (2d ed. 2003).
143. 2 RICE, supranote 142, § 9.10, at 26-28.
144. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).

145. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1,§ 6.5.2, at 566-67; Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 1183-84 (1998-99).
146. CAL. EVID. CODE § 953 (West 1991).
147. Id. § 953(c).
148. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 12.4,

at 479-80 (2d ed. 2001).
149. Id. at 479.
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priority to close family relatives. 50° In those states and under the Uniform Probate
Code, however, the court has authority to appoint "any suitable person."' For
example, after listing preferred categories of relatives, California Probate Code
section 8461(r) authorizes the court to appoint "[a]ny other person." ' 2 No
invariable requirement that the appointee be an attorney or that the appointee even
have known the decedent appears to exist.5 3 Thus, in some circumstances the
current state of the law allows lay, appointed personal representatives, who were
strangers to the decedent, to decide whether to assert or waive the decedent's
privilege. To be sure, necessity is an element in this situation, since the natural
person holder is deceased. Similarly, an element of necessity exists when the
accused is tried in absentia. Just as the administrator representing a decedent
cannot consult the former holder about his or her preference, the attorney
representing a defendant in absentia cannot confer with the absent holder. If the
law empowers the administrator to waive the decedent's privilege even when the
administrator has neither legal training nor personal acquaintance with the decedent,
it certainly' seems defensible to enable the attorney to waive the absent accused's
privilege. -4
IV. CONCLUSION

Fact situations such as Marcum are rare. In absentia trials are infrequent
phenomena, but in the exceptional in absentia trial, defense counsel may believe
introducing privileged material is in the client's best interest. The still rarer case is
one in which the privilege issue is not moot. Ordinarily, when the defense counsel
attempts to introduce a prior statement made by his or her client, the trial judge will
never have to reach the issue of whether the counsel has the authority to waive the
applicable evidentiary privilege. In part, Marcum was so extraordinary because the
issue was not moot since it arose during sentencing when the defense counsel did
not have to comply with the normal evidentiary strictures. When offered by the
defense, the accused's pretrial statement will ordinarily be inadmissible hearsay.
As rare as the Marcum situation is, however, an analysis of the situation sheds
light on more important issues such as the standard for forfeiture of constitutional
rights and the extent of an attorney's implied authority to waive a client's
evidentiaryprivilege. The analysis demonstrates once again both the soundness and

150. See id.; see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 8461 (West 1991) (listing relations in order of priority,
beginning with the surviving spouse, then children, then grandchildren, and so on).
151. McGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ,supra note 148, § 12.4, at 479.
152. CAL. PROB. CODE § 8461(r) (West 1991).
153. See MCGOVERN, JR. & KuRTZ, supra note 148, § 12.4, at 479-80.

154. In rare cases, jurisdictions have restricted the ability of successor holders to waive the
original holder's privilege. For instance, under New York law, the "personal representative of a
deceased person may waive the [physician-patient] privilege, provided that his doing so does not 'tend
to disgrace the memory of the decedent."'

CHARLES KRAMER & DANIEL KRAMER, EVIDENCE IN

NEGLIGENCE CASES 7 (7th ed. 1981) (internal footnotes omitted). For the most part, however,
successor holders have discretion as to whether to assert or waive the privilege. Rittenhouse v. Superior
Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1991).

Yet, the attorney is a fiduciary, bound to protect and pursue the client's best interests.

1

IMWINKELRIED, supranote 1, § 5.3.3c(8), at 348-49. If the attorney neglected to take any steps to learn

anything about the client's background, and any investigation would have led the attorney to realize that
in the circumstances the client would have asserted the privilege, the client could conceivably have a
cause of action against the attorney for breach of fiduciary obligation at a later point in time.
155. FED. R. EVID. 801-02.
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utility of Professor Westen's forfeiture test.' 5 6 Finally, the analysis also shows that,
like so many other propositions in the law, the generalization that only a holder can
waive a privilege must sometimes yield to necessity. Marcum addresses an
admittedly narrow problem, but there are larger lessons to be learned.

156. Westen, supra note 90, at 1260-61.
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